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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jeremiah Spicer appeals from the district court's order revoking his
probation.

He also challenges the Idaho Supreme Court's order denying his

motion to augment the appellate record.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Spicer had sex with a 14-year-old girl who had run away from home. (PSI,
pp.265-267 1 .) The state charged him with statutory rape. (R., pp.59-60.) Spicer
p!ed guilty

to

the charge. (R., p.77.) The district court imposed a unified 15-year

sentence with six years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Spicer on
probation for 20 years. (R., pp.77-84.)
Approximately a year later, the state filed a motion for probation violation.
(R., pp.109-113.) Spicer admitted violating his probation by consuming alcohol,

using methamphetamine multiple times, engaging in unauthorized sexual
relationships, and by possessing pornography.

(R., pp.109-113, 120.)

district court revoked Spicer's probation, but retained jurisdiction.

The

(R., pp.128-

130.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended
Spicer's sentence and placed him back on probation. (R., pp.138-142.)
Approximately a year and a half later, the state filed a second motion for
probation violation. (R., pp.158-167.) Spicer admitted he violated his probation

by being removed from the LIFE, Inc. residential treatment program fo·r non-

1

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file
"SpicerPSI. pdf."

1

compliance

with

program

rules,

and

by

accessing

the

internet without

authorization. (R., pp.158-167, 172; Tr., p.1, L.4 - p.12, L.4.) The district court
revoked Spicer's probation and executed the previously imposed sentence. (R.,

pp.174-177.) Spicer timely appealed. (R., pp.176-180.)
Spicer then filed an amended notice of appeal requesting the preparation
of transcripts of various hearings conducted prior to his second probation
violation. (5/15/13 Amended Notice of Appeal.) The state objected to the notice,

and the district court denied the transcript requests. (5/24/13 Objection; 6/10/13
district court "Order Denying Request For Certain Transcripts at Public Expense
on Appeal.") After the appellate record was settled, Spicer moved to augment
the record with most of the previously-requested and still-unprepared transcripts.

(7/15/13 Motion.) The state objected, and the Idaho Supreme Court denied the
motion.

(7/17/13 Objection; 7/29/13 Order.)

The Idaho Supreme Court also

denied Spicer's subsequent renewed motion to augment the record.
Motion; 10/15/13 Order.)

2

(9/9/13

ISSUES
Spicer states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Spicer due
process and equal protection when it denied his motion to
augment the record with transcripts necessarily for review of
the issues on appeal.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it
revoked Mr. Spicer's probation, or, alternatively, when it
executed his sentence without modification when it did so.

(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Spicer failed to show that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate
record?

2.

Has Spicer failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Spicer Has Failed To Show That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His
Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record

Introduction
Spicer contends that by denying his motion to augment

appellate

record with as-yet-unprepared transcripts of various hearings conducted prior to
his

second

probation

violation,

the

Idaho

Supreme

Court

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has
effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

his
him

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-23.) Spicer

has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights. 2

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).

Additionally, should this case be assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, that
Court lacks the authority to review the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny
Spicer's motion. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 620, 288 P.3d 835, 837 (Ct.
App. 2012). In Morgan, the Idaho Court of Appeals "disclaim[ed] any authority to
review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision made on a
motion made prior to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of Appeals] on
the ground that the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the state or federal
constitutions or other law." kl Such an undertaking, the Court explained, "would
be tantamount to the Court of Appeals entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho
Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond the purview of this Court.!' kl
2

4

C.

Spicer Is Not Constitutionally Entitled To The Requested Transcripts

Spicer argues that he is entitled to transcripts of various hearings
conducted prior to his second probation violation because, he claims, the failure
to provide them is a violation of his constitutional rights to due process, equal
protection, and the effective assistance of appellate counsel. (Appeilant's Brief,
pp.6-23.) The Idaho Supreme Court recently rejected similar arguments in State
v. Brunet, 2013 WL 6001894 (Idaho 2013). 3
In Brunet, the Court stated: "When an indigent defendant requests that

transcripts be created and incorporated into a record on appeal, the grounds of
the appeal must make out a colorable need for the additional transcripts." Brunet
at 3 (citing Mayer v. City of Chicaao, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971)).

"[C]olorable

need is a matter of law determined by the court based upon the facts exhibited."

lfL.

In order to show a colorable need, an appellant must show "the requested

transcripts contained

specific information relevant to [the] appeal."

lfL.

"[H]ypothesiz[ing] that the lack of ... transcripts could prevent [the appellant]
from determining whether there were additional issues to raise, or whether there
was factual information contained in the transcripts that might relate to his
arguments" does not demonstrate a "colorable need."

In other words, an

appellant is not entitled to transcripts in order to "search the transcripts for a

reason to request and incorporate the transcripts in the first place."

lfL.

Such an

endeavor is a "'fishing expedition' at taxpayer expense" - an exercise the
constitution does not endorse.

In short, "[m]ere speculation or hope that

3

Spicer did not have the benefit of the Court's opinion in Brunet when he wrote
his brief.

5

something exists does not amount to the appearance or semblance of specific
information necessary to establish a colorable need."

kl

Spicer contends that transcripts from his original change of plea hearing,
original sentencing hearing, the admit/deny hearing from his first probation
violation, the disposition hearing from his first probation violation, and his rider
review hearing are relevant, regardless of whether they have been prepared or
not, because "a district court is not limited to considering only that information
offered at the hearing from which the appeal was filed" and that "the applicable
standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry into the
events which occurred prior to, as well as the events which occurred during, the
probation revocation proceedings."

(Appellant's Brief, pp.16-17.)

It does not

follow however, that an appellant who appeals a post-judgment revocation of
probation has an automatic constitutional entitlement to a transcript of every
hearing conducted throughout the entirety of a criminal case.
Although the appellate court's review of a sentence is independent, the
review is limited, as noted in Brunet, to the "entire record available to the trial
court at sentencing." 2013 WL 6001894 at 4 (citing State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1,
5, 244 P.3d 145, 149 (2010)). As in Brunet, the record in this case contains a
voluminous amount of relevant sentencing materials including two presentence
reports, relevant police and probation reports, and multiple psychological
evaluations and incident reports from treatment providers and rehabilitative
programs.

(See PSI.)

The record also includes minutes from each of the

hearings from which Spicer has requested a transcript.

6

(R., pp.57-58, 74-75,

124-127, 135-136.)

"Therefore, the entire record available to the trial court at

sentencing is contained within the record on appeal."

Brunet at 4.

As such,

Spicer "has failed to demonstrate that he was denied due process or equal
protection by this Court's refusal to order the creation of transcripts at taxpayer
expense in order to augment the record on appeal."

lit

Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review the revocation of
probation, Spicer has failed to show that any such circumstances apply here.
There is nothing provided by Spicer that would indicate that what happened at
the prior hearings, held betvveen two and four years before the issuance of the
decisions that are at issue on appeal, was considered or played any role in the
district court's decision to revoke his probation.

Spicer has not attempted to

specuiate as to why, specifically, these transcripts are relevant to his arguments
on appeal (other than asserting, in general terms, that a district court may
theoretically consider statements made at previous hearings when making
sentencing determinations), much less demonstrate a colorable need for the
requested transcripts.

As such, Spicer's motions to augment the record with

these transcripts constitute an impermissible "fishing expedition."

See Brunet at

3.

Spicer next argues that "effective counsel cannot be given in the absence
of access to the relevant transcripts." (Appellant's Brief, p.23.) This argument
also fails.
requested

Addressing the claim that "refusal to order the creation of the
transcripts

for

incorporation

7

into

the

record"

results

in

the

"prospective[]" denial of the effective assistance of counsel, the Court in Brunet
concluded Brunet "failed to demonstrate how his counsel's performance fell
below

an

objective

standard

of reasonableness

without

the

requested

transcripts," noting "the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing is
contained within the record on appeal." Brunet at 5. The same is true in this
case. "This record meets [Spicer's] right to a record sufficient to afford adequate
and effective appellate review."

kl

As such, Spicer has failed to show a Sixth

Amendment violation based on the partial denial of his motion to augment.
Because Spicer failed to show a "colorable need" for any of the transcripts
he was denied, assuming this Court addresses his claims that the denial of his
motion to augment with those transcripts violated his constitutional rights, his
claims fail.

11.
Spicer has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion

A

Introduction
Spicer contends the district court abused its discretion by revoking his

probation, or alternatively, by declining to reduce his sentence upon revocation.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.23-29.) A review of the record and the applicable legal
standards demonstrates that the district court acted well within its sentencing
discretion considering the serious nature of Spicer's underlying crime and his
demonstrated inability to comply with the requirements of community supervision.

8

B.

Standard Of Review
"A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a

showing that the trial court abused its discretion." Morgan, 153 Idaho at 622, 288
P.3d at 839.

"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion."

State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v.
Wersland, 125 ldaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Revoking Spicer's Probation Or
By Declining To Reduce Spicer's Sentence Upon Revocation
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and

conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v.
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams,
115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260,261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114
Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to
revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the
goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.

State v.

Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ot. App. 1995); Beckett, 122
Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717.
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original
sentence executed, or may reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal
Rule 35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009)
(citing State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992);
State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)). A
court's decision whether to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of
9

discretion subject to the well-established standards governing whether a
sentence is excessive.

Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7.

Those

standards require an appellant to "establish that, under any reasonable view of

the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal
punishment." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).

Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728,
730 (1978). The reviewing court "will examine the entire record encompassing
events before and after the original judgment," i.e., "facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation."

Hanington, 148 Idaho at 29, 218

P.3d at 8.
In this case, the district court decided to revoke Spicer's probation and to
execute the underlying sentence without reduction after reviewing the case
history, the presentence reports, and other relevant sentencing materials.

(R.,

pp.174-177; Tr., p.15, L.7 - p.20, L.12.) This determination was reasonable in
light of the serious nature of the underlying crime and Spicer's continued
demonstrated inability to comply with the rules of community supervision.
When the district court gave Spicer a second chance at probation after the
period of retained jurisdiction, it made it explicitly clear that it would not give
Spicer a third chance should he continue to violate probation rules.

The court

amended "Special Condition 24" to read: "Defendant has had prior opportunities

10

for probation and a rider.

The Defendant is advised that this is [his] final

opportunity at probation. Failure to abide by the conditions of probation resulting
in a motion for probation violation, wiil, if proven or admitted, be considered a
violation of a fundamental condition of probation which will result either [sic] in
imposition of the underlying sentence." (R, pp.139-140 (emphasis in original).)
In the course of this "final opportunity," Spicer continued to violate the

terms of his probation.

Numerous incident reports complied by empioyees of

LIFE, Inc., the residential treatment program Spicer was ordered to participate in,
document Spicer's issues controlling his anger and complying with program
rules. (PSI, pp.53-80.) As summarized by his probation officer:
Mr. Spicer continues to violate LIFE, Inc[.] rules as well as
probation and parole rules. He claims he no longer wants to be in
the community, feels he'd do better in a confined environment. He
continues to show irresponsibility when given the opportunity to
[prove] he can be self[-]sufficient and make the right choices. He
deliberately is making these choices to violate his supervision, as
he is aware that is the only way to get out of the LIFE, Inc[.]
program. His aggression has increased and his ability to control his
aggressions [is] decreasing. He threatens LIFE staff, flees without
permission, does not obey lawful orders established by his
supervising officers, and utilizes the internet, text message and
With the
picture mail as well as unauthorized relationships.
defendant[']s increase in aggression, [and] desire to not be in the
community he is a danger to himself and the community.
(R., pp.165-166.)
In addition to his issues complying with the rules of the LIFE, Inc.
program, Spicer has admitted violating the terms of his probation by consuming
alcohol, using methamphetamine multiple times, engaging in unauthorized
sexual relationships, possessing pornography, and by accessing the internet
without permission. (R., pp.109-113, 120, 158-167, 172.)
11

In iight of Spicer's continued inability to comply with the rules of
community supervision, and the serious nature of the underlying charge of
statutory rape, the district court's decision to revoke Spicer's probation and
execute the underlying sentence without reduction was entirely reasonable.
Spicer has therefore failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order revoking Spicer's probation and executing the originally-imposed sentence.
DATED this 15th day of January, 2014.

~~~
MARK Vv. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15th day of January, 2014, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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